Materialism and Metaphysics
 It is normally thought that materialism is unable and maybe even unwilling to do justice to the phenomenology of consciousness as it is experienced from the first person perspective. It will be argued that this view is misguided. If materialism lives up to its standards, then it has to account for conscious phenomenology. More important, it will be demonstrated that it can do so because the standard arguments against the ability of materialism to do account for phenomenal properties can be rejected. Dualist intuitions remain but they cannot provide a basis for serious objections against a scientific explanation of consciousness.
 
CV
Michael Pauen is Professor of Philosophy at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and academic director of the Berlin School of Mind and Brain. His research focuses on the philosophy of mind and on the relation between philosophy and neuroscience.

Recent papers: How Privileged is First Person Privileged Access?, American Philosophical Quarterly 2010;
Feeling Causes, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2006;
Does Free Will Arise Freely. Scientific American 2003;
Painless Pain, American Philosophical Quarterly 2000;
Is Type Identity Incompatible With Multiple Realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien 2003.

Books: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes, München: DVA, 2007;
Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung, Frankfurt: Fischer 2004;
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes. Eine Einführung. Frankfurt: Fischer 2001.
 
 
Homepage:
www.pauen.com
 
Present Occupation:
Professor of Philosophy
Philosophical Department
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
Unter den Linden 6
D-10099 Berlin
 
Academic Director
Berlin School of Mind and Brain
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Unter den Linden 6
D-10099 Berlin
 

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